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CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES 
Abstract: This article explores factors in the financial, legal and social environ-
ments that have significantly influenced the development of corporate audit 
committees. Particular emphasis is given to the actions of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) decision requiring that 
all listed corporations have audit committees as of June 30, 1978, 
made audit committees an integral part of the corporate organi-
zation. 
The concept of an audit committee is not new. Audit committees 
first attracted attention in the late 1930's when the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and New York Stock Exchange en-
couraged their establishment after the McKesson and Robbins case. 
In recent years there has been a significant increase in the number 
of corporations that have formed audit committees [AICPA, 1978]. 
A 1970 survey by R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neuman showed that 32 
percent of the corporations responding had audit committees, 
while a repeat of the survey in 1976 showed that 87 percent had 
audit committees [Mautz and Neuman, 1977]. Congress, the SEC, 
the accounting profession and others have expressed an interest 
in and support for audit committees. 
Actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
In 1940, the SEC first recommended the establishment of audit 
committees in Accounting Series Release No. 19. This was issued in 
response to the McKesson and Robbins, Inc. investigation. The 
release proposed that, to assure auditor independence, a com-
mittee be selected from non-officer board members to nominate 
auditors and arrange details of the engagement. 
In Accounting Series Release No. 123, issued March 23, 1972, 
the SEC stated its long interest in corporate audit committees, and 
concluded with the following statement: 
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To this end, the Commission, in the light of the foregoing 
historical recital, endorses the establishment by all 
publicly-held companies of audit committees composed of 
outside directors and urges the business and financial 
communities and all shareholders of such publicly-held 
companies to lend their full and continuing support to the 
effective implementation of the above-cited recommen-
dations in order to assist in affording the greatest possible 
protection to investors who rely upon such statements. 
The stated intention of these recommendations was to impress 
on the auditor his responsibilities to investors, particularly the need 
for independence. The SEC noted in Accounting Series Release No. 
126, issued July 5, 1972, that the existence of an audit committee 
of the board of directors, particularly if composed of outside direc-
tors, should also strengthen such independence. 
In 1974, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 165 
which, among other things, added the following provision to 
Regulation 14A of the proxy rules: 
If the issuer has an audit or similar committee of the 
board of directors, state the names of the members of the 
committee. If the board of directors has no audit or similar 
committee, so state. 
In recent years, the SEC has strongly endorsed or required, as a 
result of enforcement proceedings, that individual corporations 
establish audit committees. In the matter of National Telephone 
Company, the SEC discovered the following facts: 
(1) The company faced "serious cash flow difficulties. 
(2) The company made public disclosures which did not 
disclose problems but which reported high earnings 
and projections of growth. 
(3) Outside directors were aware of the company's 
troubled financial condition and were also aware of 
the optimistic disclosures. 
(4) The company had an audit committee of three outside 
directors, but the committee never met. 
(5) Outside directors did not take meaningful steps to see 
to it that adequate disclosure be made [SEC, January 
1978]. 
With regard to the audit committee, the SEC concluded: 
2
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 13 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol13/iss2/9
Birkett: The Recent History of Corporate Audit Committees 111 
Finally, the facts developed during this investigation 
demonstrate the need for adequate, regularized pro-
cedures under the overall supervision of the Board to in-
sure that proper disclosures are being made. Such pro-
cedures could include among other things, a functioning 
audit committee with authority over disclosure matters, 
or any other procedure which involves the Board of Direc-
tors in a meaningful way in the disclosure process. With 
such procedures, the corporation's shareholders and the 
public should be more adequately protected from hap-
hazard or fraudulent disclosure [SEC, January 1978]. 
The case of SEC v. Killearn resulted in a consent decree in which 
the company agreed, among other things, to form an audit com-
mittee of three outside directors. The SEC specifically stated that 
duties of the committee would include: 
(1) Review the arrangements and scope of the audit and 
the compensation of the auditor. 
(2) Review with the independent auditor and the com-
pany's chief financial officer the company's internal 
accounting controls. 
(3) Review with the auditor the results of the audit, 
including — 
(a) The auditor's report. 
(b) The auditor's perception of the company's 
financial and accounting personnel. 
(c) Cooperation received by the auditor. 
(d) Steps to make the audit more efficient. 
(e) Significant unusual transactions. 
(f) Changes in accounting principles. 
(g) Significant adjustments proposed by the 
auditor. 
(h) Recommendations by the auditor with regard 
to internal accounting controls. 
(4) Inquire concerning deviations from the company's 
code of conduct and periodically review that code. 
(5) Meet at least twice a year with the company's finan-
cial and accounting staff to review internal account-
ing and auditing procedures. 
(6) Recommend to the board the retention or discharge of 
the independent auditors. 
(7) Review all public releases of financial information. 
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(8) Review activities of officers and directors in dealing 
with the company. 
The audit committee would also be authorized to conduct in-
vestigations related to carrying out its duties and to approve settle-
ments of certain litigation involving the company's officers. 
The SEC underscored the importance it places on an audit com-
mittee in an enforcement action concerning misleading interim re-
porting. In the case of SEC v. Mattel, Inc., it accepted Mattel's con-
sent to establish an audit committee. As a part of the ensuing settle-
ment, the court ordered that the company appoint a majority of 
unaffiliated directors and that it establish a financial controls and 
audit committee among whose major functions would be a review 
of financial controls, accounting procedures, and financial state-
ments disseminated to the public. 
In the consent decree arising from SEC v. Lum's, et al., the court, 
as part of the settlement of the SEC's allegation of manipulations 
and proxy fraud, ordered that a standing audit committee be estab-
lished. The audit committee was to consist of two or more members 
of the board of directors who were not officers or employees of the 
company and whose function would be to review the auditor's 
evaluation of internal controls and to oversee other required evalu-
ations of casino operations, personnel, and security. 
When submitting its report on its inquiry into the reason for the 
Penn Central collapse to a House subcommittee, the SEC noted 
that: 
The Commission, taking a look at the future, has paid 
increasing attention to the role, the qualifications, the 
responsibilities, and the independence of corporate 
directors, which appear to be called for. Last month the 
Commission released a statement endorsing the establish-
ment of audit committees composed of independent direc-
tors. The staff report points up the critical importance of 
the whole subject of the responsibility of directors, the 
greater utilization of public and independent directors, the 
professionalization of their function, providing staff sup-
port for directors and judging their performance not on the 
basis of hindsight but on the basis of the reasonableness 
of their judgment in the circumstances and at the time it 
was exercised. 
In 1976, the SEC again underscored its interest in audit com-
mittees, this time as a means of deterring questionable and illegal 
4
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 13 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol13/iss2/9
Birkett: The Recent History of Corporate Audit Committees 113 
corporate payments and other practices. In its report to the Senate 
on "Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices," 
the Commission wrote: 
Actions to further enhance the creation by public corpo-
rations of audit committees composed of independent 
directors to work with outside auditors would serve as a 
valuable adjunct to these legislative proposals. 
The importance of the role of the board of directors, in-
dependent audit committees, and independent counsel has 
been illustrated by the Commission's enforcement actions 
in the area of questionable or illegal corporate payments. 
Significantly, in some of these cases no audit committee 
existed. In others, with a single exception, audit com-
mittees either operated only during a portion of the time 
when the questionable payments were alleged to have 
been made, or were not wholly independent of manage-
ment. Accordingly, the resolution of these proceedings 
typically has involved establishment of a committee com-
prised of independent members of the board of directors, 
charged to conduct a full investigation, utilizing indepen-
dent legal counsel and outside auditors, to conduct the 
necessary detailed inquiries. 
The thoroughness and vigor with which these committees 
have conducted their investigations demonstrate the im-
portance of enhancing the role of the board of directors, 
establishing entirely independent audit committees as 
permanent rather than extraordinary, corporate organs 
and encouraging the board to rely on independent 
counsel. 
Acting to further strengthen the independence of auditors, the 
SEC in September 1977 proposed a rule to require disclosure in a 
company's proxy material of audit fees and services and approval 
thereof by the board of directors or its audit committee. The text 
of the proposal included the following comments: 
It is desirable for all public companies to have audit 
committees composed of independent directors and ways 
are being considered by which such committees might be 
encouraged or required. 
The Commission believes that objectivity and indepen-
dence are enhanced if the auditor deals with an audit 
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committee of independent directors or the board of direc-
tors in determining services and fees. In order to provide 
investors with knowledge of whether the board of direc-
tors or audit committee has approved all services provided 
by the auditors, the Commission proposes to require dis-
closure of whether such approval has taken place. 
More recently, in response to the recommendations of U.S. con-
gressional subcommittees, the SEC urged the AICPA to require 
audit committees as a condition of an independent audit. Speak-
ing at the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) Fifth National Conference on Current SEC Developments 
on January 4, 1978, Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the SEC, 
stated: 
The profession must take whatever steps are reasonably 
available to it — such as insisting that their clients main-
tain audit committees — to insure and enhance its in-
dependence. If the profession is reluctant to take steps 
of that nature voluntarily and of its own accord, the 
Commission will need to understand why and how that 
reluctance can be reconciled with a profession which 
desires to maintain the initiative for self-regulation and 
self-discipline. 
Harold M. Williams commented again on the importance of audit 
committees in a paper presented at Carnegie-Mellon University 
on October 24, 1979. He stated that: 
Audit committees are critical because of the fundamental 
role which the independent auditor plays in corporate ac-
countability and the special trust which the public places 
in the auditor's work. With the wide acceptance of the 
concept of the audit committee, the next question which 
must be faced is the definition of the committees' re-
sponsibilities. At present, many audit committees are, 
undoubtedly, not yet working fully effectively, and some 
may serve more to provide windowdressing rather than to 
add substance to the accountability process. The devel-
opment of a better consensus as to the minimum responsi-
bilities of audit committees should be an important 
priority. 
SEC regulation is assumed to be in the public interest, and the 
SEC's support for the development of audit committees gained 
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momentum due to the declining corporate image in the public 
sector. The August 9, 1976 issue of Business Week, began a review 
of a book on the world of business by stating that "American busi-
ness has seldom been held in such low regard as it is today. A 
succession of scandals, ranging from the collapse of Penn Central 
to ITT's misadventures in Chile to the illegal payoffs of Gulf, Lock-
heed and scores of others, has given business a corrupt and de-
humanizing image. . Antibusiness and anticorporate attitudes 
were not new in American political history, but perhaps never be-
fore had the critics been more strident in their accusations, more 
zealous in their crusade for reforms. Public confidence sagged; 
public regulation proliferated. Proposals abounded for more ac-
countability and more control of corporate activities. And there 
was the expectation that outside directors would become more 
involved in monitoring corporate conduct and governance 
[Schornack, April 1979]. 
Since the 1940 issuance of Accounting Series Release No. 19, 
the SEC has consistently shown its support of corporate audit com-
mittees. Through several court cases it has required certain in-
dividual corporations to establish audit committees and has pre-
scribed definite duties for them. In addition, Accounting Series Re-
leases Nos. 123 and 165 addressed the issue of audit committees 
and further stated the SEC's endorsement of these committees. 
Actions of the New York Stock Exchange 
The first major endorsement for the establishment of audit com-
mittees came from the New York Stock Exchange in 1939, also as a 
result of the McKesson and Robbins case. The Exchange's report 
stated, ". . . where practicable, the selection of the auditors by a 
special committee of the board of directors composed of directors 
who are not officers of the company appears desirable." 
For over twenty years the Exchange has required all newly listed 
companies to have at least two outside directors. In 1973, the Ex-
change published a 'white paper' which stated that an audit com-
mittee "no longer represents a corporate luxury, but has become a 
necessity." 
At the urging of the SEC, on January 6, 1977, the NYSE adopted 
a requirement for all listed companies to maintain an audit com-
mittee. It specifically stated: 
Each domestic company with common stock listed on 
the Exchange, as a condition of listing and continued list-
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ing of its securities on the Exchange, shall establish no 
later than June 30, 1978, and maintain thereafter an audit 
committee comprised solely of directors independent of 
management and free from any relationship that, in the 
opinion of its board of directors, would interfere with the 
exercise of independent judgment as a committee mem-
ber. Directors who are affiliates of the company or officers 
or employees of the company or its subsidiaries would 
not be qualified for audit committee membership. 
Thus, the audit committee became a required part of the corpo-
rate organization for all companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
Actions of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
In July 1967, the AICPA executive committee statement on audit 
committees of board of directors recommended that publicly owned 
corporations appoint audit committees. Specifically, the commit-
tee stated: 
The executive committee of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants recommends that publicly 
owned corporations appoint committees composed of out-
side directors to nominate the independent auditors and to 
discuss the auditor's work with them. 
Wide adoption of this practice would represent a further 
step in the continuing improvement of corporate financial 
reporting to the investing public. Audit committees can 
be a constructive force in the overall review of internal 
control and financial structure and give added assurance 
to stockholders as to the objectivity of corporate financial 
statements. 
Audit committees can assist their full boards of directors 
in matters involving financial statements and control over 
financial operations. They can also strengthen the positions 
of managements by providing assurance that all possible 
steps have been taken to provide independent review of 
the management's financial policies and operation. This 
is good for the company and good for the public. 
In July 1977, the AICPA board of directors again urged the 
establishment of audit committees and urged AICPA members to 
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encourage corporations to establish audit committees. The board 
has also asked the American Stock Exchange and regional ex-
changes to adopt audit committee requirements similar to the re-
quirement of the New York Stock Exchange. 
Report of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities. In its 
report issued in January 1978, the Commission an Auditors' Re-
sponsibilities (which was established by the AICPA) stated: 
The board of directors, with outside members and an 
audit committee when appropriate, is the best vehicle for 
achieving and maintaining balance in the relationship 
between the independent auditor and management. There-
fore the Commission believes that steps should be taken 
by boards, auditors, and when necessary, by regulatory 
authorities to help assure that boards will actively exercise 
this opportunity. Where appropriate to the size and cir-
cumstances of the corporation, board members should 
include independent outsiders, and an audit committee 
should be formed. 
Special Committee on Audit Committees. In early 1978, the AICPA 
appointed a Special Committee on Audit Committees to study 
whether the AICPA should require that companies establish audit 
committees of their boards of directors as a condition of an audit 
by an independent public accountant. Under consideration by this 
special committee were such questions as whether audit commit-
tees should be required to strengthen auditor independence, and 
should a requirement for audit committees specify duties to be per-
formed by the committee. 
As a supplemental issue, the committee was also asked to con-
sider whether the independent auditor should be required to be 
present and available to answer questions at the annual meeting of 
stockholders. While this issue is not directly related to audit com-
mittees, it does involve similar questions of applicability and im-
plementation. 
The special AICPA committee, which was formed in response to 
congressional and SEC recommendations for requiring corporate 
audit committees, concluded that it was not possible to sustain the 
considerable burden of identifying the necessity of an audit com-
mittee requirement. The AICPA reported to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission that while it continues to support the concept 
of audit committees for publicly owned corporations, it has found 
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no reasonable basis for issuing a technical standard requiring their 
establishment. The committee pointed out that it does not find 
audit committees necessary for the maintenance of auditor in-
dependence or for performance of an audit in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards. The AICPA committee also 
stated, however, that it is convinced that audit committees can be 
helpful to both corporate directors and to independent auditors. 
In addition, the committee stated that any Institute requirement 
would be viewed as an intrusion into the area of corporate govern-
ance and recommended that the accounting profession urge other 
bodies such as the stock exchanges and the National Association 
of Securities Dealers to encourage or require committees for 
publicly held companies. 
While the AICPA is unwilling to make the existence of an audit 
committee mandatory before an independent audit can be per-
formed, it has consistently shown its support for audit committees. 
The AlCPA's expressed belief in the value of the audit committee 
has contributed to their significant increase in number and im-
portance. 
Actions of Congress 
While the accounting profession, the SEC and the NYSE have 
advocated the audit committee for many years, Congress has only 
recently expressed its interest in the matter. Senate Bill 3379, in-
troduced May 5, 1976 by Senators Church, Clark and Pearson in 
response to the publicity involving questionable corporate pay-
ments, had as one of its requirements that companies establish 
audit committees made up of outside directors. The bill also would 
have required that outside directors constitute at least one-third 
of the total board membership. There was, however, no action 
taken on this bill. 
In its 1976 report on an investigation of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi-
gations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
House of Representatives (the Moss Committee), was critical of 
board of directors performance in general and specifically noted 
the desirability of audit committees. The following is an excerpt 
from that report: 
A director must be willing to devote considerable time 
to his important and continuing responsibilities. A director 
elected because of demonstrated expertise should be 
expected to manifest that expertise in fulfillment of his 
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responsibilities and should be compensated appropriately. 
The majority of the board should be detached from man-
agement and from any other conflict of interest, e.g., 
association with the company's investment banker or 
corporate counsel. The board should provide itself with an 
independent staff. A board's key audit committee should 
be comprised of a majority of independent directors who 
adopt rules to govern the committee's proceedings. The 
audit committee should have available to it independent 
expert advisors. Likewise, the nominating committee 
should be comprised of a majority of independent direc-
tors. Assuring the independence of the board and its key 
auditing and nominating committees as well as holding 
directors to professional standards of performance are 
critical to building an effective system of corporate ac-
countability to protect public investors as well as a corpo-
ration's customers, suppliers, and competitors. 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed December 19, 
1977. This Act made recordkeeping and an internal control system 
for all public companies a matter of law. Interpreters of this Act 
have subsequently suggested that audit committees could provide 
a vehicle for insuring that the provisions of the Act are met. For 
example, Leonard M. Savoie, CPA, vice-president and controller of 
Clark Equipment Company, Buchanan, Michigan, and former execu-
tive vice president of the AICPA, spoke on some of the practical 
problems of monitoring compliance with internal accounting con-
trol systems under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Savoie 
suggested that, to assure compliance, companies institute special 
procedures including annually distributing corporate policy state-
ments and guidelines to all management personnel and authorizing 
internal auditors and lawyers to investigate and report to the audit 
committee on violations of the conduct guidelines. Dennis R. 
Beresford and James D. Bond, in an article in the Financial Execu-
tive stated that the immediate effect of the internal control pro-
vision of the law will be for management, audit committees, and 
independent auditors of public companies involved in international 
trade to challenge more rigorously systems of internal control with 
a broad question similar to the following: 
How does the company's system of internal control pro-
vide reasonable assurance that an illegal foreign pay-
ment does not occur [August 1978]? 
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The Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of 
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (the Metcalf 
Committee) stated the following in its November 1977 report: 
The subcommittee strongly believes that the accounting 
profession or the SEC should immediately require that 
publicly owned corporations establish audit committees 
composed of outside directors as a condition for being 
accepted as a client by an independent auditor. 
Given this new interest on the part of Congress, a possibility 
looms that new legislation may require boards of directors of all 
publicly held companies to establish and maintain such audit com-
mittees. The principal concern is that such legislation could con-
ceivably go on to establish specific rules and regulations govern-
ing the responsibilities and performance of audit committees and 
boards of directors in general [Arthur Andersen & Co., 1978]. 
Increases in Responsibilities of Directors 
At least part of the explanation for the suddenly increased 
enthusiasm for corporate audit committees is the increased aware-
ness of the legal responsibilities of directors. A large number of 
articles in periodical business publications have emphasized the 
increasing scope of director responsibility [Mautz and Neuman, 
1977]. For example, a May 11, 1974 editorial in Business Week in-
cludes the following: 
The Securities & Exchange Commission's suit against 
the old management of the bankrupt Penn Central Railroad 
abruptly extends responsibility for corporate misdeeds to 
a broad new area. In effect, the SEC is saying that anyone 
connected with the company who was in a position to 
know what was going on and to do something about it 
will be held liable along with those who actually committed 
the offenses. Applying this philosophy to the Penn Central 
case, the SEC did not stop with bringing suit against . . . 
the former president and . . . the former top financial 
officer. It also included as defendants three outside direc-
tors of the company. 
In an article entitled "The SEC Looks Harder at How Directors 
Act," [Business Week, February 2, 1976], the following comments 
are included: 
12
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 13 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol13/iss2/9
Birkett: The Recent History of Corporate Audit Committees 121 
Last week's dismissal of Gulf Oil Corporation Chairman, 
Bob R. Dorsey, by the company's board suggests that 
some directors are already worried. Gulf's directors re-
portedly fear that the SEC would hold them liable for a 
failure to act in disciplining management implicated in 
illegal acts. 
Even outside directors without knowledge of wrongdoing 
may be legally obligated to ferret out the facts for them-
selves. That is the thrust of a consent decree that the SEC 
negotiated last summer with Theodore Kheel and John 
Castellucci, the two outside directors of Sterling Homex 
Corporation when insiders were allegedly practicing fraud 
in hiding the company's financial deterioration. 
A book review in the April 26, 1976 issue of Business Week 
commences with this statement: 
Corporate scandals have become such everyday occur-
rences that they hardly evoke surprise anymore, but 
until a few months ago, at least, one question always 
popped up in their wake: where were the directors when 
the price fixing, bribing, or polluting was going on. 
Corporate directors, faced with such charges and assertions, can 
scarcely continue in ignorance of their risks and responsibilities. 
To the extent that corporate audit committees are perceived as a 
means of reducing such risks, they are likely to be a welcome 
addition to corporate practice [Mautz and Neuman, 1977]. 
Because of limitations of time and resources, the board's re-
sponsibility is particularly heavy and, in recent years, directors 
have been facing intensifying challenges: 
(1) Companies have increased in size, diversity and com-
plexity. 
(2) Directors find it virtually impossible to be knowledge-
able about and discuss every facet of their directorate 
companies. 
(3) The number of lawsuits against directors has in-
creased, not only because of board actions but also 
because of actions by management. 
(4) The directors' obligation to exercise reasonable care 
in the fulfillment of their responsibilities to share-
holders is underscored by the trend toward litigation 
[Coopers & Lybrand, 1976]. 
13
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Corporate boards of directors must meet the challenges of their 
changing duties and responsibilities in order to fulfill their role 
within the corporate organization. The audit committee can be an 
important aid in this endeavor. 
Other Actions Supporting the Establishment of Audit Committees 
The Corporate Director's Guidebook, prepared by a subcommit-
tee of the American Bar Association, states that it is desirable that 
boards of directors establish audit committees. The audit commit-
tee is described in this publication as "the communication link be-
tween the board of directors as representatives of the stockholders, 
on the one hand, and the independent auditors on the other hand." 
Some states have audit committee requirements. For example, a 
recently enacted statute of Connecticut requires that certain corpo-
artions of that state with at least one hundred stockholders must 
establish audit committees [Connecticut General Statutes Anno-
tated, 1980]. 
In Canada, the provisions of the Business Corporations Act in-
clude the following: 
(1) The directors of a corporation that is offering its 
securities to the public shall elect annually from 
among their number a committee to be known as the 
audit committee to be composed of not fewer than 
three directors, of whom a majority shall not be 
officers or employees of the corporation or an affiliate 
of the corporation, to hold office until the next annual 
meeting of the shareholders. 
(2) The members of the audit committee shall elect a 
chairman from among their members 
(3) The corporation shall submit the financial statement 
to the audit committee for its review and the financial 
statement shall thereafter be submitted to the board 
of directors. 
(4) The auditor has the right to appear before and be 
heard at any meeting of the audit committee and shall 
appear before the audit committee when required to 
do so by the committee. 
(5) Upon the request of the auditor, the chairman of the 
audit committee shall convene a meeting of the com-
mittee to consider any matters the auditor believes 
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should be brought to the attention of the directors 
or shareholders. 
Many segments of the business community and the general public 
have shown interest in and support for corporate audit committees. 
These segments may differ in the purposes for which they support 
audit committees and in the objectives they hope will be achieved. 
However, a historical review of the development of audit committees 
shows that all interested segments expect the committees to 
strengthen the corporate image to the general public. 
While the composition of audit committees has been addressed 
by the SEC, the NYSE, the AICPA and Congress, only the SEC has 
issued any specific duties to be performed by audit committees, 
and this has only been done in specific cases for individual com-
panies. Without guidelines to maintain some consistency and 
standardization of functions and responsibilities for all audit com-
mittees, the goals for which these bodies support corporate audit 
committees may not be achieved. 
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